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ABSTRACT
Indonesia as the most populous Muslim country in the world is always interesting to be
explored. Not only consist of more than 300 local ethnics, but also as the third most
democratic country after India and USA. However, Indonesian Muslims are diverse into
different groups, which started from the early 20s century, and also developed their own
Muslim media channels. However, it seems that the political change in Indonesia has
biggest influence to the growth of Muslim groups in Indonesia. Therefore, this article
attempts to describe this influence into both Muslim groups and media from early 1900s
to 2010.
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ABSTRAK
Indonesia sebagai negara Muslim paling banyak di dunia selalu menarik untuk
dieksplorasi. Tidak hanya terdiri dari lebih dari 300 etnis lokal, tetapi juga sebagai
negara paling demokratis ketiga setelah India dan Amerika Serikat. Namun, umat
Islam Indonesia beragam ke dalam kelompok yang berbeda, yang dimulai dari
awal abad 20, dan juga mengembangkan saluran media Muslim mereka sendiri.
Namun, tampaknya perubahan politik di Indonesia memiliki pengaruh terbesar
terhadap pertumbuhan kelompok Muslim di Indonesia. Oleh karena itu, artikel
ini mencoba menggambarkan pengaruh ini ke dalam kelompok dan media Mus-
lim dari awal 1900-an hingga 2010.
Kata Kunci: Indonesia, Media, Muslim
INTRODUCTION
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim society. According to the 2010
PEW Research Report, 60% of the Muslim world’s population is from the
Asia-Pacific, of which 20.37% lives in Indonesia.1Allowing to the census
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data released by Biro Pusat Statistik Indonesia (Indonesian Statistics Bu-
reau) in 2010, the number of Muslim inhabitants of Indonesia is
207,176,162, which is 87.2% of all Indonesian citizens. Within this large
society, several Muslim groups are existed that contributes to variety prac-
tices of Islamic thought. On the other side, the growth of Muslim media
also following the growth of these groups, since most of the Muslim
media are administered by Muslim activists from each group. This article
will provide a historical overview of Indonesian Muslim groups and me-
dia.
The earliest evidence of Islam was found on a gravestone with a Mus-
lim date of 1082 in Leran, East Java.2 Further proof came from Marco
Polo’s report about his travels in Sumatra (one of the largest islands in
Indonesia) around 1292. He stated that there was a Muslim community
founded by ‘Moorish’ traders at Perlak. He also found Muslim influence in
tombstone names, such as ‘Malik Al Shalih’ from nearby ‘Samudra Pasai’
port.3 ‘Samudra Pasai’ is now known as Aceh.4
The spread of Islam in Indonesia grew with the increasing European
demand for Indonesian herbs and spices from the 13th century onwards.
Muslim traders from Egypt, Yemen, and Gujarat played important roles in
spreading Islamic values through international trading routes from Indo-
nesia to Europe at that time. Some areas in Indonesia, including northern
Java, the Mollucas, and Srivijaya, became centres of spice trading.
Azumardi Azra (2002) explains three patterns of Islamisation in Indo-
nesia. The first pattern was that certain cities became centres of trading
and of Islamic communities. In such centres, the sovereigns converted to
Islam. Subsequently the monarchy played an important role in Islamisation
in their regions. The second pattern was that the elite from those king-
doms studied Islam at centres of Islamic education, such as Giri and Gresik
in East Java. The third pattern was that Islamic kingdoms supported other
non-Islamic kingdoms that wanted to take over other territory, provided
that the non-Islamic kings converted to Islam. For example, support was
given by the Demak monarchy to the Banjar kingdom that wanted to
dominate the Daha kingdom after the king of the former converted to
Islam.
Some factors helped Islam become the majority religion in Indonesia.
According to Nurcholis Madjid, Indonesia is one of the countries that did
not employ its military force for the purposes of spreading Islam.5 Pen-
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etration Pacifique (peaceful penetration) is known as the approach of
Islamisation in this country, brought by Muslim traders from Arabia and
India. Islam became a new trend and offered new political and economic
opportunities.6 Furthermore, intermarriages between the traders and lo-
cal residents facilitated mutual acculturation, including that of Islamic
values.
Another factor that helped Islam spread easily in Indonesia was the
simplicity of its teaching, which could easily be understood by local resi-
dents.7 The form of Islam at that time was syncretic and mystical, which
was close to Hinduism and Buddhism, the predominant beliefs of the
country. For this reason, it was easily possible to convert people to Islam
in Indonesia (Madjid, 1996: Maemunah, 2006; Pringle, 2010). Also for
this reason, Islamic values can be seen in Indonesian culture today. For
instance, the names of months in Javanese were adapted from the Islamic
calendar8, the Islamic features of the Hindu Tenggerese community9 were
described by Robert Hefner, and the true story of two Javanese Islamic
Kyais in Serat Cebolek was written by Kanjeng Raden Adipati Suryakusuma
in 1892, in the form of 32 poems in Macapat (one of the famous forms of
Javanese poems).10
The influence of Islam can be seen in the content of Pancasila (the five
principles), the official ideology in Indonesia, even though the term itself
is of Sanskrit origin. The first sila, ’believe in One God’, resonates with
‘Monotheism’, which is in line with Islamic teaching that only believes in
one God. Sukarno, the first Indonesian president, was such a worshipper.
He was the inventor of Pancasila. Originally, Sukarno put the ‘believe in
One God’ precept as the fourth sila, but this idea was rejected by politi-
cians with an Islamic orientation. Another negotiation that took place
between politicians with an Islamic orientation and Sukarno regarded the
idea of ‘nationalism’, which was the original idea of the third principle,
‘The Unity of Indonesia’. Muslims objected to ‘nationalism’ because it
was against the concept of Islamic universalism and cosmopolitanism,
and because it reminded them of the chauvinist nationalism of Germany
and Japan.
When discussing Indonesia, one cannot exclude Islam as the major
religion in this country. Some phases of Islamic movements have affected
the history of this nation. This article will explain the phases of Muslim
groups, from the rise of freedom pressure groups as a reaction to Dutch
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colonialism in Indonesia from the beginning of the 20th century, to the era
of reformation since the fall of Suharto and through the first 10 years of
the 21st century. This article also presents a brief history of Islamic media
in each phase within Indonesian history from the beginning of the 20th
century. The authoritative power of each era seemed to influence the chang-
ing life of the majority of religious society in Indonesia.
INDONESIAN MUSLIM GROUPS IN THE EARLY 20TH CENTURY
Modern Islamic movements in Indonesia first appeared in the early
20th century, when a lot of Muslim leaders realised that it was impossible
to compete with Dutch colonialism, Christian penetration, and other at-
tempts to step forward while they still employed traditional efforts to
establish Islamic influences.11 According to Deliar Noer, the root of mod-
ern Islamic movements has come from two substantial advances within
Muslim societies: education and social movements on the one hand, and
political movements on the other.
Syaikh Ahmad Khatib pioneered the modern education and social
movements in Indonesia. He was born in Bukittinggi, Minangkabau,
Sumatera in 1855. He continued his studies in Mecca in 1876 and be-
came an Imam of Syafii mahzab in Masjid al Haram. Although he taught
Syafii’s mahzab, he never forbade his students to learn about Muhammad
Abduh’s concept of modernisation in Islam.12 Some of his students from
Indonesia were Syaikh Muhammad Djamil Djambek, Haji Abdul Karim
Amrullah, and Haji Abdullah Ahmad from Minangkabau, Kyai Haji Ahmad
Dahlan from Java (the founder of Muhammadiyah), and some traditional-
ist leaders, such as Syaikh Sulaimanar-Rasuli from Bukittinggi, and Kyai
Haji Hasjim Asj’ari, the founder of Tebu Ireng pesantren in East Java. Later,
Kyai Asj’ari became the leader of NU.13
Syaikh Ahmad Khatib’s students disseminated Islamic teaching when
they returned from Mecca. They inspired other local Islamic leaders to
establish new Islamic movements. They taught Islam in local traditional
communities in Minangkabau, such as Syaikh Djambek and Haji Abdul
Karim Amrullah. They published Islamic magazines, similarly to what Haji
Abdullah Ahmad did with Al-Munir (1911-1916), Al-Akhbar (1913), and
Al-Islam (1916).
Kyai haji Ahmad Dahlan founded Muhammadiyah in 1912 as a social
Islamic organisation that still exists today. Some other new Islamic
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organisations launched included Al-Jam’iyat al-Khairiyah in Jakarta (1905),
PersyarikatanUlama in Majalengka, West Java (1912), Al-Irsyad in Jakarta
(1913), Persatuan Islam (Persis) in Bandung (1920), and PersatuanMuslimin
Indonesia (Indonesian Muslim Association) in Padang (1929).14
The political movements stemmed from the Ethical Policy applied un-
der Dutch colonialism in Indonesia in 1901. This policy was suggested by
Snouck Hurgronje,15 the consultant for local residents’ issues, to limit Is-
lamic values for the middle class.16 Hurgronje recommended distinguish-
ing between Islam as a religion and Islamists as anti-Dutch colonialists. As
a religion, Islam was a set of moral guidelines that should be tolerated,
similarly to the situation between Protestants and Catholics in the Nether-
lands itself. Related to this issue, he argued that Islam was not an enemy.
The rebellion of Islam extremists in some areas might be caused by inap-
propriate Dutch policy, such as the restriction on the Pilgrimage to Mecca,
and the oppression dealing with the ‘fanatic’ Islamist leaders.
On the other hand, Hurgronje acknowledged that the involvement of
Javanese aristocracy and traditional leaders in the outer Javanese islands
could possibly be an effective counterweight to the increase in Islam. He
cited the case of the Balinese, who still upheld the caste system that was
successful in keeping the Balinese as devout Hindus, delegating the politi-
cal roles to the higher caste. Balinese did not, however, call for a separate
nation. Based on that view, Hurgronje advocated the Ethical Policy that
included two main issues: sending young Javanese aristocrats to the Neth-
erlands for their studies, and giving colonial civil service jobs to the edu-
cated upper classes (Karim, 2006; Pringle, 2010).
The effect of more education among people of the upper classes was
the increase in awareness of nationalism. Although they were becoming
secular nationalist groups, they were able to cooperate with Islamic na-
tionalist groups to fight for Indonesian freedom against Dutch colonial-
ism. The earliest awakening movement was led by Mas Ngabehi Wahidin
Sudirohusodo, a doctor from Yogyakarta who spread awareness and col-
lected money to offer scholarships to local citizens in 1906. He promoted
the idea of education for gifted children to achieve a better future. His
ideas were supported by his colleagues from the Medical Faculty in Jakarta,
and he established the first modern organisation named ‘Budi Utomo’ on
May 20th, 1908.17
Inspired by Budi Utomo, other local Islamic traders, RM Tirtoadisoerjo
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and Haji Samanhudi, started a new Islamic organisation called ‘Sarekat
Dagang Islam’, then better known as Sarekat Islam (SI), in 1911 (Noer,
1990; Karim, 2006). The competition with Chinese traders and their arro-
gance towards local merchants were the reasons for the launch of this
institution. SI was the first mass Islamic movement in Indonesia, having
more than two million members by 1919.18
From 1918, SI had representatives in the Volksraad, the parliament
during the Dutch colonial period. This opportunity opened channels for
the Islamic voice to be heard by Dutch administrators. In 1923, SI changed
its orientation from a traders’ association to an Islamic political party. This
party was first named Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII). PSII was fol-
lowed by other Islamic parties, such as Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Permi)
in 1930, and Partai Islam Indonesia (PII) in 1938.
During this period, Deliar Noer (1990) classified Muslim activists into
two groups: secular nationalists and Muslim nationalists. Secular nation-
alists were those who believed in Islam but tended to be neutral and
tolerant to other values, and some of them ignored their religion’s asser-
tions. In contrast, Muslim nationalists were those who took Islamic thought
as the reference for their movement.
Moreover, the rising number of educated Muslims also influenced the
comprehension and practice of this religion. Deliar Noer (1990) differen-
tiated between two main streams among Muslim groups: traditionalists
and modernists. Traditionalists were those whose application of Islam was
limited to that of the teaching of the Ulama, who lived from the seventh
to the 13th century.19 The traditionalists were those who focused on reli-
gious teaching and worship practices. For them, Islam was about fiqh
(the rules of Islam), and they accepted taqlid (following the leader with-
out criticising him) and refused ijtihad (decisions about solving contem-
porary problems that were not anticipated in the Qur’an, Sunnah, and
Ijma’ – the Ulama’s interpretations).20
The traditionalists tended to follow their Kyais (Islamic leaders) and
totally devoted themselves to their leaders. For these groups, their Kyais
had no sins, and the Kyai’s statement was final: nobody may question it.21
This situation created an education system that focused more on
memorising than understanding Islamic teachings. The followers did not
have the courage to entertain different opinions than those of Kyais, and
knowledge transfer tend to be a one-way communication process, with-
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out any discussion. Because they focused on religious matters, these groups
generally did not become involved in politics. They were not anti-politics,
but they were likely to limit themselves to their pesantrens, and spend
their whole lives in them.
On the other hand, Noer (1990) argued the modernists had a more
open attitude to the application of Islamic thought. Islamic teaching was
not only deals with fiqh and practical worship, but it also had relevance to
daily life. Islam was a universal teaching that could be applied to any
time, any place, and under any condition. Islam was a reformed religion.
It would not obstruct the exploration of knowledge, the development of
science, or the position of women in society. Thus, Islam could be under-
stood through a ‘modern’ lens.
The modernists, inspired by Muhammad Abduh’s notion of a reform
of Islam, only follow al Qur’an and Sunnah as the resources that inform
their thinking. They believed that the ijtihad can still be opened wider, and
they refused taqlid.22 The modernists believed that Islam offered freedom
of thinking that could enhance the quality of a life led by Islamic values.
This notion was contradictory to that of the traditionalists. Ijtihad has led
the modernists to pay attention to the argument, rather than to the one
who has the argument. This is why the modernist teacher did not
monopolise Islamic teaching, unlike in the case of the Kyai in traditional-
ists’ view. The modernists agreed that Islamic discussion could be held
outside of the pesantrens and mosques, and that Islamic teaching could
be discussed, too. This view is contradictory to that of the traditionalists,
who completely trust the man (the Kyai) who has the argument. Modern-
ist Muslim leaders at that time were not only from Ulama, like Haji Rasul
and KH Ahmad Dahlan, but were also businessmen, like Haji Abdullah
Ahmad, Samanhoeddhi, and Ahmad Hasan. They were also aristocrats
and cultural leaders, like Tjokroaminoto, Salim, Moeis, Natsir, as well as
government administrators, like Gunawan and Djajadiningrat.
Ahmad Dahlan pioneered the modernist Islamic movement. He estab-
lished Muhammadiyah in 1912. His preaching about Islam attracted a
wide range of people, from businessmen to educated people. His toler-
ance, kindness, and helpfulness made him easily accepted within the com-
munity. However, his initiative to revise kiblah, the direction of praying,
generated a strong reaction from his seniors. Later on, Muhammadiyah
focused its movement on establishing education and health centres in
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marginal societies.
Besides Muhammadiyah, modernists supported other Islamic
organisations and political parties as well. The other modernist Islamic
organisations were Syarekat Islam, Al-Irsyad, and Persatuan Islam (Persis).
Some political parties that held Islam as their foundation were Partai Muslim
Indonesia and Partai Islam Indonesia.
NU, founded by Kyai Hasjim Asj’ari23, KH Abdul Wahab, and KH Bisri in
1926, was primarily established as a response to the growth of modernist
Islam, and particularly Muhammadiyah. The fast-growing modern schools
run by Muhammadiyah threatened the traditional pesantrens’ existence
at that time. Muhammadiyah had also loosened the Kyai-Santri relations,
which was the main issue in NU traditions. The rivalry between both
organisations prompted the dynamics of Islamic movements in Indonesia
until the late 1900s.
In his book, Kuntowijowo (2008) stated that the NU movement was
based on the agricultural Islamic traditions and on communal solidarity.
This organisation attracted numerous participants mostly from rural areas
because the Kyais joined it as their Islamic leaders. The NU had traditional
institution networks that needed to avoid the influence of not only
Muhammadiyah as the modernising movement, but also SI (which be-
came PSII in 1923) as the political movement that had great influence on
Indonesian Muslims at that time.
INDONESIAN MUSLIM GROUPS IN THE SUKARNO ERA (1945-
1965)
The dominant issue in this era was the debate about the ideological
foundation of this state after the Declaration of Independence on August
17th, 1945, when Sukarno became the first president of Indonesia. The
contention took place between Muslims, Communists, and Nationalists.24
The conflict arose from debates about the constitution among politicians,
and progressed to the Communist rebellion in 1948 and Darul Islam (DI/
TII) from 1948 to 1962; Sukarno’s presidency had to be ended in 1965
when the biggest revolt by the Indonesian Communist Party occurred.
The debate about ‘seven words’ in the Jakarta Charter, which became
the preamble of the Indonesian constitution, took more than 14 years to
resolve through debate (Pringle, 2010; Boland, 1971). The seven words
were the added phrase after ‘Belief in God’. The phrase was ‘dengan
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kewajiban menjalankan syari’at Islam bagi pemeluknya’ (with the obliga-
tion for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law). The non-Muslim
politicians rejected these words because they did not agree with the no-
tion of an Islamic state, but the Muslim politicians argued that these words
were only for Muslims and could be the foundation of law in Indonesia
since Muslims constituted the majority religion in Indonesia. The debate
was ended by President Sukarno when he launched the ‘Decree of the
President of Indonesia, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with
regard to the Return to the Constitution of 1945’ on July 5th, 1959.25 By
this decree, Sukarno dissolved the Constitutional assembly, the place where
the debate on the Indonesian constitution took place.
Moreover, the unity of all Islamic groups, such as Muhammadiyah,
NU, and PSII, occurred through a change in the form of the Masyumi
party in 1945. The establishment of Masyumi was based on the agree-
ment of Kongres Umat Islam (the Congress of Muslims) on November 7th,
1945 in Yogyakarta.26 The basic objective of this party was to ensure that
Islamic values were the foundation of Indonesia. Initially, this party was
supported by all elements of Islamic groups that existed at the time; but
the discordance within those cohorts could not be resisted, and internal
disunity happened through the discharge of PSII and NU in 1947 and
1952, respectively. Finally, Sukarno dismissed Masyumi in August 1960
after he released his decree in July 1959.27
When Sukarno launched the Decree in July 5th, 1959, he started the
new era of his presidency called ‘Demokrasi Terpimpin’ (Guided Democ-
racy) until his fall in 1965. During this era, he dismissed the assembly and
built a new ‘parliament’ with no ex-Masyumi activists there and elimi-
nated most of the Islamic leaders who opposed him. He succeeded in
marginalising Islamic leaders during his regime. However, NU was still
allowed to join parliament and had the opportunity to support Sukarno
in his cabinet. Wahid Hasjim, one of NU’s leaders, was appointed as Min-
ister of Religion in 1950. By his hand, Islam had the opportunity to spread
more widely by establishing Islamic subjects in schools’ curricula (includ-
ing pesantrens, the traditional schools), from elementary schools to State
Islamic Institutes.
Previously, while Masyumi and other Islamic leaders were active before
they were dismissed by Sukarno, they succeeded in 1950 in introducing
the Education by Law no. 4 of April 4th, 1950 article 20, which deter-
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mined that religious knowledge had to be taught in all state schools.
Furthermore, the religious subjects must be delivered over two hours each
week, beginning in the fourth year of elementary school. Since then, Is-
lamic teaching has been boosted extensively all over Indonesia via state
schools, not only inside the pesantrens, which were previously the only
place in Indonesia to study Islam.
Indonesian Muslim Groups in the New Order Era (1966 –
1998)
According to Haedar Nashir (2013) in his book ‘Islam Syari’at’, the
power of Muslim activists in Sukarno era was raised against the Indone-
sian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia or PKI), which had close
relations with Sukarno in the last years of his presidency.28 The PKI was
believed to have a mission to arrange a communist revolution to apply
the world’s communism dictatorship, which would turn Indonesia into
an unreligious nation by reducing Pancasila (five pillars) into Ekasila (one
pillar), that is gotong royong (mutual assistance).29 The PKI movement
was terminated after its coup on Sukarno’s presidency, which was known
as G30S/PKI.30 After the bloody military response to the coup, and after
the PKI was banned, Sukarno instructed Suharto to restore national secu-
rity and Suharto took the role of the second Indonesian president.
Suharto’s well-known objective was forging massive development in
Indonesia under his ‘orde baru’ (New Order), especially in the economic
sphere. In the beginning, Suharto brought a new hope for many Islamic
leaders who had been repressed during Sukarno’s era. However, such hopes
were not fulfilled, given Suharto’s political performance. In 1973, all four
Islamic political parties that existed at that time were merged into one
political party named Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, the Develop-
ment Unity Party), which had no ‘Islam’ label in its name.31 Suharto also
restricted the activities of all political parties (including PPP) under the
Kabupaten or Kotamadya.32 This meant that there were no activities by
political parties in rural areas that had direct contact with people in the
lowest level of society. It could clearly be seen that Suharto wanted to
limit the influence of political parties, and use ‘Golongan Karya’ as the
only political tool to support his regime.
The other step that drew objections from most Islamic organisations
in Indonesia was Suharto’s decision about Pancasila as the only funda-
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mental ideology (asas tunggal) for all Indonesian institutions, including
political parties and other Muslim organisations. This policy was legis-
lated in the Government’s regulation number 8 in 1985 about Social
Organisations. There were numerous social organisations that continued
to deny Pancasila as the only fundamental ideology of the nation, and
this could cause serious social disintegration. As a consequence of this
regulation, PPP had to change Islam to Pancasila as its fundamental ideol-
ogy. This regulation also attracted other Islamic-based organisations that
disagreed with it.
During the New Order era, some Islamic groups were established that
originated from a transformation of previous Muslim activists or as a part
of transnational Islamic movement networks. Muhammad Natsir was one
of the examples of the movement of the existing Muslim activist. Natsir
was the leader of Masyumi; he shifted his focus from politics to dakwah33
or an intensive program of religious predication34, following the limita-
tions on the activities of Islamic parties. In May 1967, Natsir commenced
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Islamic Mission
Council), an organisation that supports Islamic revitalisation and prohib-
its conversion of Muslims to other religions. Natsir also supported the
establishment of Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA – the
Islamic and Arabic Studies Institution), a branch of Muhammad bin Saud
University from Saudi Arabia in 1990. This institution became the source
of Islamic Wahabbi Salafism, which includes among its alumni some who
became Salafi leaders (Bruinessen, 2002; Pringle, 2010). Later, Natsir and
Abu Bakar Ba’asir were two important figures who supported the funda-
mentalist movement. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir was the heir to the Darul Islam
movement that had been banned in 1962, and was alleged linked to
Komando Jihad’s activists who were behind ‘terrorist’ actions by bombing
several churches, cinemas, clubs, and the Borobudur temple in the 1970s
and 1980s35. After his release from jail and his return from Malaysia, Abu
Bakar Ba’asyir found Pesantren Al Mukmin, the salafi school that was widely
known as the ‘radical’ salafi. This pesantren is located at Ngruki, Solo (in
central Java) and was founded in 1972. In post-Suharto era, Abu Bakar
Ba’asyir was accused of being the leader of ‘Jama’ah Islamiyah’, which
was responsible for several bombings in the early 2000s.
On the other hand, some new Islamic activists also emerged as a branch
of international Islamic movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood from
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Egypt and HTI from Jerusalem (Noorhaidi, 2012; Bruinessen, 2002). In
the future, in the post-Suharto era, these transnational movements ex-
isted in political36 and non-political movements.37
Meanwhile, Nurcholis Madjid was one of the most important figures
promoting Liberal Islam in Indonesia. His speech entitled ‘The Necessity of
Renewing Islamic Thought and the Problem of the Integration of the
Umma’, which was delivered on January 2nd, 1970, became the mark of
the renewal movement (gerakan pembaharuan) in Islam. One of his con-
troversial ideas was the ‘Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!’, which invited de-
bates and protests from other Islamic activists. His way of confronting the
‘mainstream’ Islamic thought was criticised as ‘impolite’ according to se-
nior Islamic leaders. A lot of Islamic leaders attacked his notions of ‘secu-
larism’ and ‘pluralism’.
Nurcholis Madjid is known as the ‘bourgeois pluralist’ for his belief
that all religions in Indonesia should be considered as ‘equal’. Madjid
stated that the problem of pluralism in Islam was the problem of Muslim
adaptation in this modern age, because Muslims could not assimilate to
rapid changes in global society (Madjid, 1996). This statement drew the
criticism from conservative Muslims that it could be used by Christians in
their efforts to evangelise Christianity.
Madjid became the father of tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia, and
a number of modern Muslim scholars follow his concepts. His followers
are mostly intellectual Muslims who have completed tertiary education.
Madjid’s notion seems to make sense when he tries to see Islamic teach-
ing through a liberal interpretive lens. Most Islamic leaders (including the
modernists) reject this approach because there are prescribed methods to
interpret the Qur’an, one of which is incompatible with the liberal inter-
pretive approach. Thirty years later, in 2001, Ulil Absar Abdala continued
to promote his way of thinking through the Jaringan Islam Liberal (JIL, the
network of Islamic liberation), which allows ordinary people to interpret
Islam and offers ideas of a reform movement in Islamic teaching in Indo-
nesia. This movement has provoked criticism from other Islamic leaders.
These leaders state that this movement deviates from the original way of
understanding Islam.
The growth of liberal followers, as well as followers of other Islamic
thought, was caused by the growth of the economy, society, and policy
under the New Order – an outstanding achievement of Suharto’s. The
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New Order resulted in the growth of a powerful new middle class that
was more educated and wealthier than before. William Liddle (1996) cor-
relates this situation with the growth of ‘creative’ Islamic thinkers, whom
Liddle labelled substantialists38 and the growth of ‘reformist’ scriptualists39.
Fachri Ali and Bachtiar Effendy classify four Islamic patterns in the New
Order: Neo-Modernism, Socialist-Democracy, Internationalism or Islamic
Universalism, and Modernism.40 Neo-Modernism is the viewpoint that
marries Islamic values with modern conditions and processes without di-
luting basic Islamic values. The figures who support this view are Nurcholis
Madjid and Abdurrahman Wahid. The Socialist-Democracy standpoint calls
for Islam to be the transforming power for all aspects of national life.
Based on this notion, Islam should be considered in every socio-political
process of change. Its innovators are Adi Sasono, M Dawam Raharjo, and
Kutowijoyo.
The third pattern is Internationalism or Islamic Universalism. The Uni-
versalism group believes that Islam has universal values, including nation-
alism as long as this does not contradict fundamental Islamic teaching.
Amien Rais, Jalaludin Rahmad, and Endang Saepuddin Anshari are the
proponents of this view. The last pattern is Modernism, which emphasises
the rationality of Islamic thought within the modern context. Ahmad Syafii
Ma’arif advocates this stance.
Following the fall of the Indonesian rupiah by up to 70% relative to
the US dollar over the course of six months in late 1997, a financial crisis
was generated in Indonesia. This economic frustration became one of the
reasons for political reformation instituted by Suharto’s opponents, such
as Megawati Sukarnoputri (daughter of Sukarno) and Amien Rais, the
leader of Muhammadiyah. Suharto faced massive demonstrations against
him by metropolitan university students and finally resigned his presidency,
allowing Habibie, his vice-president, to take office in May 1998.
Indonesian Muslims in the Early 21st Century (1999 – 2010)
The collapse of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ regime of almost 32 years ush-
ered in a new period of Indonesian history called ‘orde reformasi’ (Refor-
mation Order). Indonesia became a prime example of a democratic shift
in Muslim societies.41 Everybody, including Islamic groups, may express
feelings and thought freely after the constraints imposed by Suharto had
been dissolved. The most striking issues emerging in this era are the dis-
114 AFKARUNA
course about radical Islam and the discussion about Jaringan Islam Liberal
(JIL), which had been spearheaded by Nurcholis Madjid in the previous
period.
Noorhaidi Hasan (2012) argues that the emergence of radical Islam in
Indonesia is considered to be a response to Suharto’s repressive handling
of Muslim activists during his period, which resulted in the revolutionary
idea to fight against the tyrant sovereignty.42 For example, the appear-
ance of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) is closely linked to the under-
ground movement Negara Islam Indonesia (NII), which was banned in
Sukarno’s era. MMI held its first congress in 2000 as the mark of its estab-
lishment and chose Abu Bakar Ba’asyir as its leader. Yet, because Ba’asyir
considered that MMI did not apply the Islamic norms in terms of leader-
ship within the organisation, he quit MMI in October 2008 and formed a
new organisation, Jama’ah Ashorut Tauhid (JAT).
Hasan (2012) and Bruinessen (2002) agreed that the other reason for
the rise of Indonesian radical movements was rooted was the disappoint-
ment relating to the government’s policy. An example pointed by Pringle
(2010) is the militias formed by some Muslim leaders as a response to the
slow reaction of government in handling conflicts in several places in In-
donesia. Local conflicts involving religious issues took place in west and
central Kalimantan from 1996 to 2001, Maluku and north Maluku from
1999 to 2004, and in Central Sulawesi from 1998 to 2007. Laskar Jihad43
and Jemaah Islamiyah44 were the militia formed to defend the Muslims in
affected areas. Some members of these brigades had been former volun-
teers in Afghanistan’s war to end Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989.
The presence of Front Pembela Islam (FPI, Islamic Defender Front) found
by Habib Rizieq Syihab in 1998 was also a response to the disappoint-
ment in government policy in handling the acts against Islamic values
within the society. FPI’s movement seeks to transform Muslim life from
ignorance of living within Islam into a pure Islamic society.45 FPI pursues
its aims in controversial ways, such as closing bars, casinos, hotels, and
other places that are viewed as offensive to the values of Islam.
Kuntowijoyo (2008) describes radicalism as being espoused by new
fragment groups within Indonesian Muslim societies that emerge as an
effect of globalisation. He mentions two kinds of fragment groups: reli-
gious fragment groups and political fragment groups. The religious frag-
ment groups appear as a reaction to marginalisation processes and the
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style of modern life. Psychologically, they feel loss of control in dealing
with new social processes. Sharpening social polarisation can cause these
groups to mushroom in society. In the rural areas, polarisation removes
them from the folds of communal solidarity, while in urban areas it tends
to make people coalesce in groups bearing on rigid beliefs and character-
istics. Both contexts push people to forge new social identities, which can
be done through the making of new Islamic groups. Examples of this kind
of group are Darul Hadits and Islam Jama’ah.
The second kind of fragmenting groups, according Kuntowijoyo (2008),
is more political in character. These groups are usually still in the main-
stream, but they try to isolate themselves or to be exclusive. They become
radical because they are disappointed with their leaders’ response to so-
cial and political change. On the other hand, those who are frustrated
because of religious issues tend to be radical in actualising their goals.
This radicalisation appears because they tend to be close-minded. Thus,
their ability to analyse social facts is low. According to Kuntowijoyo (2008),
radicalism is an emotional movement, without a thorough understanding
of macro-social analysis.
By contrast, as a reaction to these radical movements, JIL or Liberalist
Islam became more popular in the early 21st century. Liberalism offered a
new way of understanding Islam and was spread by Ulil Absar Abdala, a
young Indonesian Islamic scholar and the founder of JIL. Abdala also in-
troduced a new methodology in interpreting Islam. Normally it is only
certain Ulama with certain qualifications who may interpret the content
of the Qur’an. The qualifications are to guarantee that the mufassirin (the
interpreter of the Qur’an) is a knowledgeable person and has credibility in
applying Islamic values, so that his or her interpretation of the Qur’an will
not deviate from the origin of Islamic teaching. In addition, the qualifica-
tions of the mufassirin have the purpose of ensuring the purity of Islamic
teaching.
Abdala suggests a new methodology in interpreting the Qur’an. In
early 2000, Abdalla recommended a controversial ijtihadi methodology in
assessing the Qur’an.46 According to him, everybody can interpret the
Qur’an drawing on his or her own knowledge; there are no special re-
quirements needed for interpretation. He also says that all religions are
the same and that no religion is better than another. This means that
every human being needs a religion, but that he or she does not have to
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be a Muslim, because Islam is the same as other religions. Abdala’s other
controversial notion is that syari’ah (Islamic Law) is a product of human
history.
Abdala’s controversial notion has drawn a striking reaction from most
Islamic leaders. Media Dakwah magazine (2004) accused JIL of being part
of a Jewish-Zionist plot, because this network was sponsored by USAID.
This fact was then used repeatedly to frame JIL as a member of ‘a con-
spiracy’ aimed at undermining Islam in Indonesia. MUI, the official Islamic
leaders’ assembly, finally released MUI Fatwa no. 7, 2005, which banned
pluralism, liberalism, and secularism in Indonesian Islam.47
All in all, a variety of Muslim groups have been in existence in the post-
Suharto era. These groups range from militant to liberal Muslims. Taufik
Abdullah (2013) defines militant Muslims as ‘those who are intolerant to
the variation of opinion about Islam’. Included in militant Muslim groups
are FPI, Laskar Jihad, MMI, and HTI. On the other hand, liberal Muslims
are those who have objective perspectives and admit that other religions
are equal with Islam. The well-known Liberal Islam Network figures are
Ulil Abshar Abdala and Lutfie Assyaukanie. On the other hand, moderate
Muslim groups, which represent the majority of Muslims in Indonesia, are
in the middle; they tend to tolerate various opinions but do not accept
the notion that all religions are similar to Islam. NU and Muhammadiyah,
two largest Muslim organisations in Indonesia, refer to themselves as
moderate.
An example of the differences between militant and moderate Mus-
lims is in the way they accept democracy applied in Indonesia. Noorhaidi
Hasan (2012) argues that Militant Muslims perceived democracy as a sys-
tem that does not exist in the two main references for Muslims: Al Qur’an
and Sunnah. Democracy is interpreted as a thogut system, which pro-
duces leaders who are unfaithful to Islamic law (Arrahmah, February 23rd,
2013). Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, a militant Muslim leader, stated that the Indo-
nesian government since the Sukarno era until now has been thogut,
because it applied non-Islamic law, and led Indonesian Muslims to be-
come detached from Islamic values and unfaithful to them. Upholding an
Islamic state is an ideal goal for all Muslims to actualise Islamic Chaliph
into reality.48 Since the Muslim activists reject democracy, they also refuse
to participate in any elections held in Indonesia.
Conversely, Hasan (2012) states moderate Muslims tend to accept the
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idea of democracy and believe that it is a strategic system to promote
good governance. Some moderate Muslim groups formed political par-
ties after Suharto resigned, and the Reformation Order was begun. Haedar
Nashir (2013) categorises Islamic political parties that were born at that
time into two groups: the party with Islam as the official fundamental
principle and the party with the support of Muslim society. Partai Persatuan
Pembangunan (PPP, Development Unity Party), Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB,
Moon-Stars Party), and Justice Party (PK, which then became Prosperous
Justice Party, PKS) are examples of the first category. All of those parties
have overtly declared to have Islam as their fundamental reference.
The second category comprises political parties with the support of
the Muslim community. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Resur-
rection Party) is formed with the support of the NU community, while the
Partai Amanat Nasioanal (PAN, National Mandate Party) is supported by
the Muhammadiyah community. Both parties do not openly declare them-
selves to be Islamic parties, and they are more inclusive. Both parties al-
low non-Muslims to join.49
A Brief History of Indonesian Muslim Media
This sub-chapter aims to provide a brief history of Indonesian Muslim
media, which followed the development of Muslim movements from the
early 20th century. Like the growth of Muslim groups affected by the social
politics at that time, the dynamics of Muslim media also relate to the
recent situation faced by Muslim organisations and their environment.
Unfortunately, references about the history of Muslim media in Indonesia
are limited compared to references about mainstream media. Therefore,
this sub-chapter describes the Muslim media that existed from early 20th
century and relate them to the situational political dynamics and the role
of Muslim groups during that time.
The Emergence of Islamic Media in the Early 20th Century
Deliar Noer (1990) mentioned the modern Islamic movements of the
early 20th century developed from educational and social movements. As
more Muslim scholars returned from their studies in the Middle East and
Europe, there was more awareness among them of being occupied by the
Dutch government, and they pioneered the nationalism and freedom
movements among their societies.
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The first Indonesian Muslim media outlet was initiated by Haji Abdullah
Ahmad, the Padangnese ulama, who became the leader of Jamaah Adabiah
in Padang, West Sumatra in 1908. Al Munir, the name of the magazine
that emerged in 1911, was inspired by Al-Imam magazine, the fortnightly
magazine published in Singapore. Al-Imam was the first Islamic reform
magazine in Southeast Asia from 1906 to 1909, and this magazine in-
spired Haji Abdullah Ahmad to create a similar medium in his hometown.
The Al Munir content included Islamic teachings, the story of the prophet
Muhammad, and translated articles about the international Islamic world
– an particularly the Middle East – from Al-Manar magazine Cairo. Haji
Abdullah Ahmad also initiated the news magazine Al Akbar (1913), and
became editor of the religious desk at Sarekat Islam media, Al Islam, in
1916.
Sarekat Islam (SI) played an important role in expanding Islamic media
during the 1900s until Indonesia’s independence in 1945. HOS
Tjokroaminoto and Haji Agus Salim, both important figures in Sarekat
Islam, gave their full support in promoting Islamic media outlets during
that time. Some media were officially administered by SI, such as Neraca
(1916-1924), Hindia Baru (1924-1926), Laskar (1930-1932), and Fajar
Asia50 (1927-1930). Other Islamic media were not part of SI but were
supported by Agus Salim and Tjokroaminoto, including Bendera Islam
(1924-1927), Bintang Islam (1923-1926), Mustika (1931-1932), and
Utusan Hindia (1914-1923) (Noer, 1990). Both individuals were known as
respected figures in the struggle for Indonesia’s independence.
Muhammadiyah and NU, as modernist and traditionalist Muslim groups
that emerged during that time, also had internal media outlets.
Muhammadiyah, the modern Muslim group, initiated several media out-
lets, such as Soeara Muhammadijah (1912), Adil (1932-1942), and
Pancaran Amal (1936-1939), as well as some media collaborations be-
tween Muhammadiyah and SI figures, such as Bendera Islam (1924-1927)
and Bintang Islam (1923-1926). NU also had its own internal media out-
lets, such as Utusan Nahdlatul Ulama (1928-1930), Swara Nahdhatul Ulama
(1937-1941), and Berita Nahdlatul Ulama (1935-1940).
Beside Muhammadiyah and NU, some other Muslim organisations also
had their own media outlets, such as Al-Lisan (1935) and Pembela Islam
(1929-1933), owned by Persatuan Islam (Persis, Islamic Unity). Jong
Islamieten Bond, the Muslim organisation whose members were those
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who had Dutch educational backgrounds, had Het Licht (The Light) (1925-
1940).
Noer (1990) identified the content of Islamic media from 1900 until
1945 was varied. The content was not only about Islamic teachings; it
also discussed other nations’ circumstances. This fact is interesting, since
at that time Indonesian audiences had limited access to information about
other nations. Bintang Islam, Al Munir, and Suara Muslimin were three
Islamic media outlets that discussed other nations’ conditions, inspiring
the audience to fight for independence against Dutch colonialism in In-
donesia.
During World War II, there were political changes in Indonesia when
Japan occupied Indonesia and took over Hindia Belanda authority. The
Japanese occupation lasted from 1942 to 1945. During that time, the
Japanese government strictly oversaw the Indonesian papers by taking
over all Dutch and Chinese media, and maintaining Japanese newspapers
and magazines in the Melayu language, which carried Japanese propa-
ganda in Indonesia (Smith, 1986). Unfortunately, there is insufficient ref-
erence available to explain what happened to Islamic media during the
Japanese occupation.
Islamic Media during Sukarno’s Era (1945 – 1965)
Sukarno’s era lasted from Indonesia’s Independence Day on August
17th, 1945 until he resigned as the first president in 1965. During that
time, the shift in power in Indonesia was not only against the allied forces
of the Netherlands and the UK, which wanted to return to Indonesia after
the Japanese occupation; the power also spread among Indonesian na-
tionalists, Islamists, and Communists to build power bases in forming a
new independent Indonesia.
The Islamic media were also influenced by the situation at that time.
Almost all Muslim activists were involved in politics, forming political par-
ties like the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia from SI), which
Muhammadiyah and NU activists later agreed to merge into one Islamic
political party called Masyumi. To extend their political influence to broader
Indonesian society, Masyumi published newspapers and magazines. Abadi
is Masyumi’s official newspaper that expresses the party’s position to so-
ciety. Abadi was founded in 1947 and has had a striking influence as
Islamic media in the general society ever since. This influence can be seen
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from the re-birth of this newspaper in 1968, after it was banned in 1959,
in line with the dismissal of Masyumi in the implementation of the ‘Presi-
dential decree’ on July 5th, 1959. Abadi was banned for the second time
in 1974, when it was accused of supporting the Malari tragedy. Malari
was the first protest movement during Suharto’s presidency, and was spon-
sored by university students in Jakarta. They protested against Suharto’s
ignorance of public policy, on January 14th to 15th, 1974. Unfortunately,
the demonstration led to the vandalism of hundreds of building, cars,
and motorcycles, which were burned and ruined in the middle of Jakarta.51
Hariman Siregar, the leader of the protest, however, denied that students
were responsible for all of the vandalism. The effects of the vandalism
were too broad to have been causes solely by the student protest partici-
pants. Hariman believed that there must be a stronger agent who could
have committed the vandalism.
 Hefner (1997) summarises that Suharto used this tragedy to rid him-
self of Abadi, the biggest Islamic newspaper at that time. Besides news-
papers, Masyumi’s supporters also launched magazines that promoted
Masyumi’s aims. The two well-known magazines were Hikmah (1948-
1958) and Pandji Masyarakat (1959-1961).
Masyumi significantly influenced the rise of Islamic media in Sukarno’s
era via its media outlets, which had become the main reference for Mus-
lims on current issues. Smith (1986) recorded that the circulation of the
Abadi newspaper was up to 17,000 per day. The momentous role that
Masyumi had from 1945 until 1957 was not only in Islamic media, but
also in Indonesian politics. Masyumi earned second place in the Indone-
sian general election in 1955, after Sukarno’s party, PNI (Partai Nasional
Indonesia, Indonesian National Party). Masyumi activists were also chosen
to be involved in the cabinets. Therefore, even though this party had been
dismissed by Sukarno in 1960, the ex-activists of Masyumi continued their
struggles in different forms, such as via the DDII in Suharto’s era.
Islamic Media in the New Order Era (1966 – 1998)
The Islamic movements in Suharto’s era, also known as the New Order
Era, were limited. Suharto not only merged all Islamic parties into one
party named ‘Partai Persatuan Pembangunan’, but he also removed the
symbol of Islam in both the name and logo of the party. Suharto also
forced all organisations – including Islamic organisations – to acknowl-
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edge Pancasila as the only fundamental ideology (asas tunggal) within
their organisations.
In terms of media, Suharto enforced control systems that required all
media to gather two kinds of licences, a printing permit and a publishing
permit, for which in 1982 the Ministry of Information issued a new media
permit called the Press Publication Enterprise Permit or SIUPP.52 All media
had to possess a SIUPP in order to circulate their media to the general
public. Since the large payment required for a SIUPP was up to $140,000,
only limited Islamic media outlets had a SIUPP at that time. According to
Hefner’s investigations, only Muhammadiyah owned a SIUPP. Therefore,
the other Islamic media could not be displayed in general bookstores, and
were only circulated among limited Muslim groups and societies.
Despite the strict censorship and limited publication access during the
New Order Era, this era was also marked by the widened spectrum of
Islamic movements, from fundamentalism to liberalism. This spectrum was
also projected in Islamic media. Hefner (1997) mentions in his article that
there were Media Dakwah launched by DDII with a militant background,
Suara Muhammadiyah managed by Muhammadiyah, with a moderate
background, and Ulumul Qur’an, administered by Lembaga Studi Agama
dan Filsafat (LSAF), which consists of liberal Muslim activists. In addition,
Republika, The general Muslim newspaper whose stock was offered and
owned by the Muslim public, was born under the initiative of Ikatan
Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia (ICMI), the new Muslim organisation sup-
ported by Suharto, founded in 1990.
Republika published its first newspaper on January 4th, 1993. The online
version was launched on August 17th, 1995 and it became the first online
newspaper in Indonesia. Republika is the first national newspaper that is
acknowledged as an Islamic newspaper, because it was founded by ICMI
and its initial investment was raised through shares being personally of-
fered to Indonesian Muslims.53 Despite the ownership change to PT Mahaka
Media, the newspaper’s positioning as Islamic newspaper remains today.
Islamic Media in the Early 20th Century (1999 – 2010)
The fall of Suharto became the momentum for media freedom, since
the SIUPP regulation that limited media circulation was dropped during
Habibie’s era. Press regulation was changed to reflect a liberal press, after
the previous regulation (law no 21/1980) had been dismissed and re-
122 AFKARUNA
placed with the new law no. 40/1999. This new regulation limits the
government’s intervention in press freedom. Due to the new regulation, a
myriad of new media emerged at that time. Based on Serikat Penerbit
Surat Kabar (the Newspaper Publishers Association) data, up to 1997 there
were 289 registered media, and this number skyrocketed to 1,687 in
1999.54 Islam media also followed this upward trend. Large numbers of
Islamic magazines appeared; even though some of them might have ex-
isted in the Suharto era, at that time they could only be circulated to
internal members. For example, there are some militant magazines from
salafi backgrounds such as As Sunnah, Assyariah, An Nashihah, Fatwa,
Qiblati, Nikah, and Elfata.
During this era, the internet as the new medium also began to spread
among Indonesians. This new technology has also brought some changes
in the landscape of Indonesian media. Muslim activists use the internet to
spread more ideas about Islam and their concerns about their surround-
ings, which are related to their ideological backgrounds. Griffith et al.
(2013) find that the violent ideological group websites use a variety of
media to spread their ideological beliefs and may create a larger commu-
nity of shared values than they presently have. These groups also high-
light certain pictures and issues to create the affective process for indoc-
trination and maintenance of their group members.55 Sageman (2008) –
as cited by Bergin et al. (2009) – highlights the growth of community
interest via internet initiated by the nature of anonymity among internet
users, which leads them to disclose themselves easily via the internet, and
to develop greater feelings of closeness among them. Therefore, to spread
the ideological interests and to gather a wider society, many new websites
with Islamic names and symbols have arisen since 2005. Some of those
websites are salafy.or.id (2005), alsofwah.or.id, eramuslim.com (2005),
arrahmah.com (2006), and Muslim.or.id (2008).
Some scholars have investigated the use of websites for spreading radi-
cal messages in Indonesia. Bergin et al. (2009), in a special report for the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute published in March 2009, reported
the number of internet users in Indonesia skyrocketed by 900% between
2000 and 2008. Bergin et al. also discovered that the number of websites
with radical content increased drastically, from 15 in 2007 to 117 within
a year. Within this report, Bergin identifies a variety of administrators of
these radical websites: they are radical Muslim groups’, pesantren’s, and
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sympathetic groups’ websites, which are run by groups of individuals with
no links to any radical or extremist groups.56 In addition, Hui (2010) ex-
amines the radical websites description that frequently published the in-
justice concerned with the live threaten received by other Muslim jihadist
and the compliment for martyrdoms. 57
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the development of Muslim groups in Indonesia was
closely related to political changes and the struggle to of Muslims to earn
recognition from the Indonesian authorities. Indonesian Muslim activists
also played significant roles in the process of spreading awareness of na-
tionalism during Dutch colonialism, as well as the struggle to achieve
Indonesia’s independence. Furthermore, they were actively involved in
Sukarno’s cabinet, until Sukarno took a stance against certain Muslim
activists from Masyumi because of the allegations that they were involved
in the Darul Islam rebellion that aimed to create an Islamic nation within
Indonesia. After that, Indonesian Muslims became marginalised, even in
Suharto’s era. Muslim movements have existed since the fall of Suharto
until and continue to exist today.
Islamic media emerged as one of the tools to spread Muslim organisa-
tions’ ideas from the very beginning of the movements. Some of those
media took the form of the official outlets of the organisations, seeking
to create a commonality of views through the way in which news and
issues were framed, while others were general media outlets with Islamic
values embedded within news content. The form of the media also varied
following the communication technology developments of the era.
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